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Requiring Plaintiffs to Prove Irreparable Harm: “It Isn’t Right.”
(Herb Reed Enters, LLC v. Fla Entm’t Mgmt. Inc. (9th Cir.2013))
By: Anthony Kremer
I. Introduction
“It isn't right for you to hurt me / It isn't right to make me blue / It isn't right to take my kisses /
And give them to somebody new. . .”
–The Platters, It Isn’t Right 1
The Platters were one of the most popular bands of the 1950s.2 The band was admitted
into the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame in 1990, and even today, their music maintains a degree of
popularity.3 Although band members came and went from their ranks, the trademark everyone
recognizes them by, “The Platters,” has remained the same.4 Sadly, however, The Platters
trademark has become the subject of decades of litigation regarding the mark’s ownership, as
multiple groups have laid claim to and have used the mark since the 1950s.5
In 2011, it was determined that Herb Reed, the founder of The Platters, owned the rights
to The Platters trademark.6 At that point, Herb Reed had the right to sue others who used The
Platters mark unlawfully.7 But another, more daunting, legal question presented itself: whether

THE PLATTERS, It Isn’t Right, on ALL-TIME GREATEST HITS (The Island Def Jam Music Group 2004). The
procedural history of Herb Reed., LLC, v. Fla. Entm’t Mgmt., 736 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 2013) has had its share of
clever references to The Platters’ discography. See id. at 1242 (“[T]he names of The Platters’ hits ironically
foreshadowed decades of litigation – ‘Great Pretender,’ ‘Smoke Gets In Your Eyes,’ ‘Only You,’ and ‘To Each His
Own.’”); See also Herb Reed Enters., LLC v. Fla. Entm't Mgmt., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102566 (D. Nev. July 24,
2012) (“In this case, the assignee of founding band member Herb Reed ask the Court to tell Defendants - who
promote an unlicensed show featuring a group called The Platters - that ‘It Isn't Right.’ Plaintiff asks that the Court
answer Reed's ‘Prayer,’ and hold that Defendants are a merely [sic] "Great Pretender" while ‘Only You [Reed]’
(‘and [Reed] Alone’) owns ‘The Platters’ mark.).
2
The Platters Biography, THE ROCK AND ROLL HALL OF FAME AND MUSEUM, available at
http://rockhall.com/inductees/the-platters/bio/.
3
Id.
4
See id.
5
Herb Reed Enters., LLC, 736 F.3d at 1243-45.
6
Id. at 1244.
7
See id at 1247.
1
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plaintiffs like Herb Reed must prove that damage done to their trademark by infringers cannot be
adequately compensated by money damages, or whether plaintiffs benefit from a presumption
that such damage would be irreparable.8 This question has become a critical cog in the
determination of whether a court should bar a defendant’s illegal use of trademarks, and while
legal tradition sided with the later stance, this conclusion is under serious fire.9
Part II of this Casenote provides a basic framework for intellectual property law in the
United States by analyzing the U.S. Constitution, federal statutes, and existing case law. Part II
also explains how courts have previously evaluated the need for injunctions in lawsuits. Part III
discusses the case Herb Reed Enters, LLC v. Fla. Entm’t Mgmt. and the Ninth Circuit’s holding
that irreparable harm cannot be presumed in a trademark infringement context. Part IV critiques
the Ninth Circuit’s analysis. Finally, Part V concludes that the presumption of irreparable harm
should continue to be implemented in trademark infringement cases where the plaintiff is
seeking a preliminary injunction.
II. Background
A. Intellectual Property Law
1. Basis, Rationale, and Purpose
Intellectual property consists of “intangible rights [which] protect[ ] commercially
valuable products of the human intellect.”10 Three predominant types of intellectual property are
patents, copyrights, and trademarks.11 Patents are a “governmental grant of the exclusive right to

8

See id. at 1248-49.
See id.
10
Black’s Law Dictionary 930 (10th ed. 2014).
11
Id. Other kinds of intellectual property include “trade-secret rights, publicity rights, moral rights, and rights
against unfair competition.” Id.
9
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use an invention”12 such as new processes, machines, methods of manufacturing, and
compositions of matter.13 Copyrights are intellectual property rights in an “original work[ ] of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression.”14 Common types of works protected by
copyright are literary, musical, and dramatic works, as well as motion pictures and sound
recordings.15 Finally, trademarks are “word[s], phrase[s], logo[s], or other sensory symbol[s]
used . . . to designate the source of goods or services.”16 Apple® and its bitten apple logo are
examples of well-recognized trademarks.17 Patent legislation is embodied in the Patent Act,18
copyright legislation in the Copyright Act,19 and trademark legislation in the Lanham Act.20
Each of these predominant types of intellectual property have certain legal foundations.21
Copyrights and patents have their foundation in the Intellectual Property Clause of the
Constitution, which states that Congress has the power “[t]o promote the progress of science and
useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their
respective writings and discoveries.”22 “Useful arts” refers to patent law, and “science” refers to
copyrights.23 The basis for trademark law in the United States, however, is not so clearly defined
in the Constitution.24 The Supreme Court has declared that trademark law cannot be justified by
the Intellectual Property Clause.25 Instead, Congress’s ability to regulate trademarks comes from

Black’s Law Dictionary 1046 (10th ed. 2014).
35 USCS § 101.
14
17 USCS 102.
15
Id.
16
Black’s Law Dictionary 1721 (10th ed. 2014); see also 15 USCS § 1127.
17
See Apple Trademarks List, APPLE, available at http://www.apple.com/legal/intellectualproperty/trademark/appletmlist.html.
18
See generally 35 USCS.
19
See generally 17 USCS.
20
See generally 15 USCS.
21
See Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 93-94 (1879).
22
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
23
See 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER, DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §1.02 (Matthew Bender, Rev. Ed.).
24
Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 93-94.
25
Id.
12
13
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the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.26 That clause states that Congress has the right to
“regulate commerce . . . among the several states.”27
There are also certain rationales and purposes behind patent, copyright, and trademark
law.28 Patents, according to the Supreme Court, “foster and reward invention” by giving
inventors an economic monopoly on their inventions, “promote[ ] the disclosure of inventions to
stimulate further innovation,” and create a public domain of knowledge for the public to use.29
Similarly, an often cited justification for copyright law is that it encourages authors to produce
creative works for public consumption by protecting an author’s rights to benefit economically
from those works.30 The rationale behind trademark law, however, is different.31 Trademarks
serve two important functions in society: “to protect both consumers from deception and
confusion over trade symbols and to protect the plaintiff's infringed trademark as property.”32
2. Causes of Action
The owner of a patent, copyright, or trademark, has relatively exclusive rights to that
intellectual property and the ability to prevent others from using it.33 The use of another’s
intellectual property without permission is called “infringement.”34 Particularly, in order to

26

See 17 USCS §1127; See also S. Rep. No 79-1133, at 4-5 (2d Sess. 1946).
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
28
Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979); see Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954); 1 J.
THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2:2 (4th ed.).
29
Aronson, 440 U.S. at 262.
30
See Mazer, 347 U.S. at 219.
31
See MCCARTHY, supra note 28.
32
Id. (citing Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 855 (1982); Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco
Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 782, n.15 (1992) (J. Stevens, concurring).
33
See 35 USCS § 154 (“Every patent shall [give the patent holder]. . . the right to exclude others from making,
using, offering for sale, or selling the invention. . .”); 17 U.S.C.S. § 106 (“[T]he owner of copyright. . . has the
exclusive rights . . . (1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies . . . (3) to distribute copies . . . of the
copyrighted work to the public by sale . . . or by rental, lease, or lending[.]”); 15 U.S.C.S. § 1115 (“[A] mark
registered . . . [under] this Act [gives] . . . the registrant[ ] exclusive right to use the registered mark in commerce on
or in connection with the goods or services specified in the registration[.]”).
34
See Black’s Law Dictionary 900 (10th ed. 2014).
27
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prove trademark infringement, a plaintiff must prove that he or she is “(1) the owner of a valid,
protectable mark, and (2) that the alleged infringer is using a confusingly similar mark.”35 To
gauge whether the defendant’s mark is confusingly similar to the plaintiff’s mark, courts will
consider the following factors:
(1) strength of the mark, (2) proximity of the goods, (3) similarity of the marks, (4)
evidence of actual confusion, (5) marketing channels used, (6) type of goods and the
degree of care likely to be exercised by the purchaser, (7) defendant's intent in selecting
the mark, and (8) likelihood of expansion of the product lines.36
These factors are collectively referred to as the “likelihood of confusion” standard, and it is
relatively similar across state and federal jurisdictions.37 A plaintiff need not demonstrate that all
of these factors weigh in their favor nor that actual confusion with consumers exists.38
Ultimately, if the court finds trademark infringement, the consumer goodwill associated with the
plaintiff’s marks is deemed at risk because consumers might believe the infringing products or
services are that of the plaintiff.39 If these products and services are of poor quality, that might
prevent consumers from purchasing the products and services of the plaintiff.40 In instances like
these, plaintiffs can seek relief through the courts.41
Another cause of action in trademark law is trademark dilution.42 Trademark dilution
occurs when one attempts to make an association between his or her mark and an already famous
mark, resulting in the famous mark becoming less distinctive or causing harm to the reputation of

Herb Reed Enters., LLC v. Fla Entm’t Mgmt. Inc., 736 F.3d 1239, 1247 (9th Cir. 2013).
AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979) (emphasis added).
37
4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 23:1:50 (4th ed.).
38
See Sleekcraft, 599 F.2d at 348, 353.
39
See 5 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 30:47 (4th ed.).
40
Id.
41
See id. at § 30:1.
42
15 USCS § 1125(c).
35
36
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the famous mark.43 Plaintiffs in trademark dilution cases are capable of seeking relief through
the courts “regardless of the presence or absence of actual or likely confusion, of competition, or
of actual economic injury.”44
3. Injunctive Relief
Two common forms of relief in intellectual property cases are preliminary and permanent
injunctions.45 Injunctions are equitable remedies that, in the context of intellectual property
infringement cases, force a potential or found infringer to cease copying another’s intellectual
property.46 Preliminary injunctions, if granted, take effect before and during an infringement
trial.47 Permanent injunctions can be granted once the trial court has found infringement.48 In
order for a plaintiff to receive a preliminary injunction, they must demonstrate:
[1] [T]hat [the plaintiff] is likely to succeed on the merits, [2] that [the plaintiff] is likely
to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, [3] that the balance of
equities tips in [the plaintiff’s] favor, and [4] that an injunction is in the public interest.49
The second factor, irreparable harm, refers to damages that cannot be remedied with money
damages.50 If a plaintiff is able to prove that these four items exist in a trademark infringement
context, they can receive a preliminary injunction to stop a potential infringer’s actions until a
final decision is made at trial.51 However, plaintiffs must also place a bond with the court before
the injunction can be granted.52 If the trial court does find infringement, the court could then

43

15 USCS § 1125(c)(2)(B),(C).
15 USCS § 1125(c)(1) (emphasis added).
45
McCarthy, supra note 39, at § 30:1.
46
Id. at § 30:4.
47
See 11 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEURE § 2947 (3d ed.).
48
MCCARTHY, supra note 39, at § 30:1.
49
Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).
50
MCCARTHY, supra note 39, at § 30:46.
51
Id. at § 30:1.
52
Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c).
44
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grant a permanent injunction as well as money damages.53 The test for determining whether a
permanent injunction is appropriate is fundamentally the same as that for a preliminary
injunction, except instead, there must be a finding that the plaintiff has suffered irreparable
harm.54
B.

Related Case Law

Traditionally, courts have applied a presumption of irreparable harm in trademark
infringement cases.55 A presumption is a rebuttable “legal inference or assumption that a fact
exists because of the known or proven existence of some other fact or group of facts.”56
Presumptions of irreparable harm have been applied in trademark cases, largely because courts
have found that the reputational harm done to plaintiffs by a defendant is “virtually impossible to
quantify in terms of monetary damages.”57 Some courts justify the presumption based on the
strength of a plaintiff’s case of likelihood of confusion.58 If the case for likelihood of confusion
is stronger, courts are more likely to presume irreparable harm than if the case for likelihood of
confusion was very weak.59 Importantly, the presumption in trademark infringement cases, like

53

MCCARTHY, supra note 39, at § 30:1.
See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). (“A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that [the
plaintiff] has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are
inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and
defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent
injunction.”).
55
MCCARTHY, supra note 39, § 30:46 (4th ed.).
56
Black’s Law Dictionary 1376 (10th ed. 2014).
57
Groupe SEB United States, Inc. v. Euro-Pro Operating LLC, 774 F.3d 192, 205 n.8 (3d Cir. 2014); See also Kraft
Foods Grp. Brands LLC v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., 735 F.3d 735, 741 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[I]rreparable
harm is especially likely in a trademark case because of the difficulty of quantifying the likely effect on a brand of a
nontrivial period of consumer confusion.”).
58
MCCARTHY, supra note 39, at § 30:45.
59
See e.g. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 735 F.3d at 740 ("[T]he more likely it is the plaintiff will succeed on the
merits, the less the balance of irreparable harms need weigh towards its side; the less likely it is the plaintiff will
succeed, the more the balance need weigh towards its side."); see also MCCARTHY, supra note 39, at § 30:45.
54
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other legal presumptions, is rebuttable; a defendant still has a chance to show the court that their
potentially infringing activities will not result in irreparable harm to the plaintiff.60
The presumption of irreparable harm, however, has come under increasing judicial
scrutiny in light of two recent Supreme Court rulings: eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC and
Winter v Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.61 These two decisions, both of which came out within
the past decade, have greatly influenced the discussion of injunctions and irreparable harm in
trademark infringement cases, notwithstanding the fact that neither case discusses trademark law
nor mentions the presumption of irreparable harm.62 While some circuit courts continue to apply
a presumption of irreparable harm in trademark infringement cases,63 some have begun to
question the practice,64 and others, including the Ninth Circuit, now reject the presumption.65
a. eBay Inc., v. MercExchange, LLC
In eBay Inc., v. MercExchange, LLC, eBay and one of its subsidiaries, Half.com, were
sued by MercExchange for patent infringement.66 MercExchange claimed that eBay and
Half.com infringed MercExchange’s patent, which covered “electronic market design[ ] to
facilitate the sale of goods between private individuals by establishing a central authority.”67 At
trial, the district court found that eBay and Half.com had infringed MercExchange’s patent, but

60

MCCARTHY, supra note 39, at § 30:47.
See generally Jeffery M. Sanchez, Comment, The Irreparably Harmed Presumption? Why the Presumption of
Irreparable Harm in Trademark Law Will Survive eBay and Winter, 2011 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 535.
62
Id.
63
See, e.g., Abraham v. Alpha Chi Omega, 708 F.3d 614, 627 (5th Cir. 2013).
64
See, e.g., N. Am. Med. Corp. v. Axiom Worldwide, Inc., 522 F.3d 1211, 1228 (11th Cir. 2008).
65
Herb Reed Enters, LLC v. Fla Entm’t Mgmt. Inc., 736 F.3d 1239, 1250 (9th Cir. 2013).
66
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 390 (2006).
67
Id.
61
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MercExchange was denied a permanent injunction.68 The Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit reversed and granted the injunction because of the finding of patent infringement.69
The Supreme Court ultimately vacated the Federal Circuit’s decision.70 Neither the
district court, nor the appellate court, according to the Supreme Court, had correctly applied the
four-factor test to determine if a permanent injunction was appropriate, given eBay and
Half.com’s infringement.71 The Patent Act, the Court stressed, states that injunctions “may [be]
issue[d] only in accordance with the principles of equity” and that the principles of equity dictate
that all four factors exist.72 Congress, the Court hinted, could indicate through legislation a
departure from these principles of equity if necessary.73 As a result, the Court declared that the
“categorical grant” of an injunction upon a finding of patent is improper.74 The Court also
alluded that the same line of reasoning applies to copyright infringement cases and other suits
governed by the rules of equity.75 The majority opinion did not reference trademark law.76
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy, while concurring with the majority opinion,
added caveats to it.77 In his concurring opinion, Justice Roberts observed that “there is a
difference between exercising equitable discretion pursuant to the established four-factor test and
writing on an entirely clean slate.”78 He went on to imply that in applying the Court’s rationale
in eBay, courts must be mindful of historical practice.79 Justice Kennedy, in his own

68

Id. at 390-91.
Id.
70
Id. at 394.
71
Id. at 393-94.
72
Id. at 394 (internal quotes omitted; emphasis added).
73
Id. at 392.
74
Id. at 393-94.
75
Id. at 394.
76
See generally id.
77
See id. at 394-97. (JJ. Roberts and Kennedy, concurring).
78
Id. at 396-97. (J. Roberts, concurring).
79
Id. (J. Roberts, concurring).
69
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concurrence, echoed Justice Roberts’ concerns, stating, “historical practice . . . is most helpful
and instructive when the circumstances of a case bear substantial parallels to litigation the courts
have confronted before.”80 He also noted that the court’s conclusion on irreparable harm was
appropriate in the patent context:
When the patented invention [at issue] is but a small component of the product the
companies seek to produce and the threat of an injunction is employed simply for undue
leverage in negotiations, legal damages may well be sufficient to compensate for the
infringement and an injunction may not serve the public interest.81
b. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.
Another case recently decided by the Supreme Court that discusses injunctions is Winter
v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.82 In Winter, the U.S. Navy had developed and used a
technology called MFA sonar to detect underwater submarines.83 The Navy was sued by the
Natural Resources Defense Council and others which claimed that the MFA sonar caused great
physical and social harm to marine mammals.84 The ultimate result of the complex trial and
appellate proceedings was a preliminary injunction that limited the Navy’s ability to use MFA
sonar.85 In their analysis of irreparable harm, both the trial court and the Ninth Circuit
determined that the “possibility” that marine life would be injured through use of MFA sonar
constituted irreparable harm that weighed in favor of an injunction.86
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the appellate court and vacated the
injunction.87 The mere possibility of irreparable harm, the Court declared, was too lax of a
80

Id. (J. Kennedy, concurring).
Id. (J. Kennedy, concurring; emphasis added).
82
See generally Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008).
83
Id. at 12-13.
84
Id. at 17-18.
85
Id. at 19-20.
86
Id. at 21-22.
87
Id. at 33.
81
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standard to apply to a remedy as powerful as a preliminary injunction.88 Instead, the Court
surmised that judges should apply the same standard they always have: a likelihood of
irreparable harm.89 The Supreme Court admitted that, given the evidence at trial, a likelihood of
irreparable harm could still be proven, but the Court still reprimanded the lower courts for not
considering the Navy’s willingness to abide by some of the restrictions already in place before
upholding the stricter injunction.90 That, combined with the fact that the Navy had been using
MFA sonar for over forty years, cast doubt on whether irreparable harm was truly occurring.91
In the end, the Court declared a decision on the likelihood of irreparable harm was not needed
since the public interest factor weighed in favor of letting the Navy continue using the MFA
sonar.92 To the Court, there was not a real enough threat to marine mammals to justify
handicapping the Navy’s training exercises and use of MFA sonar.93
C. Aftermath in the Circuit Courts
In light of the Supreme Court’s rulings in eBay and Winter, the circuit and district courts
are being forced to answer whether presumptions of irreparable harm should continue to exist.94
For example, now neither the Second Circuit nor the Ninth Circuit applies a presumption of harm
in copyright cases.95 In addition, the Third Circuit has recently held in a false advertising
lawsuit, Ferring Pharms, Inc. v. Watson Pharms, Inc., that it violated the principles of equity to

88

Id. at 22.
Id.
90
Id. at 22-23.
91
Id. at 23.
92
Id. at 26.
93
Id.
94
See, e.g., Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 94 (2nd Cir. 2010); Ferring Pharms., Inc. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 765
F.3d 205, 216 (3d Cir. 2014).
95
See Salinger, 607 F.3d at 94; See also Flexible Lifeline Sys. V. Precision Lift, Inc., 654 F. 3d 989, 998 (9th Cir.
2011).
89
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allow a presumption of irreparable harm in any cases arising under the Lanham Act.96 Such a
presumption, the Third Circuit declared, “function[ed] as an automatic or general grant of an
injunction . . . inconsistent with [the] principles of equity.”97
Not surprisingly, the debate has also turned directly on whether a presumption of
irreparable harm should continue to apply in trademark cases, and while some circuits have
recognized the issue, they have failed to decide on it.98 For example, in North American Medical
Corporation v. Axiom Worldwide, Inc., the Eleventh Circuit recognized that the presumption of
irreparable harm has come under fire since eBay but “decline[d] to decide whether . . . trademark
infringement gives rise to a presumption of irreparable injury.”99 The Eleventh Circuit asserted
that upon remand, it was entirely within the district court’s discretion to rule that the presumption
of irreparable harm was “an appropriate exercise of its discretion in light of the historical
traditions” cited by Justices Roberts and Kennedy in eBay.100
Another prominent example of this is found in the Fifth Circuit decision Paulsson
Geophysical Services v. Sigmar.101 After first finding for the plaintiff, based on a likelihood of
success on the merits for trademark infringement,102 the court declared that it would not
expressly endorse a presumption of irreparable harm and noted the presumption posed “a
difficult question” in light of eBay.103 However, the court found that the likelihood of trademark
infringement was a serious threat to the plaintiff’s goodwill in new markets where the plaintiff

96

Ferring Pharms., Inc., 765 F.3d at 216.
Id. at 217.
98
MCCARTHY, supra note 39, at § 30:47:30. (citing, inter alia, Voice of the Arab World, Inc. v. MDTV Medical
News Now Inc., 645 F.3d 26, 98 (1st Cir. 2011); North America Medical Corp. v. Axiom Worldwide, Inc., 522 F.3d
44, 50 (11th Cir. 2008)).
99
N. Am. Med. Corp. v. Axiom Worldwide, Inc., 522 F.3d 1211, 1228 (11th Cir. 2008).
100
Id.
101
Paulsson Geophysical Servs. v. Sigmar, 529 F.3d 303, 305 (5th Cir. 2008).
102
Id. at 312.
103
Id. at 313.
97
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was trying to develop.104 The threat of losing these markets due to the infringing acts of the
defendant, the court found, could not be quantified and were, thus, irreparable.105
The Sixth Circuit has avoided commenting on the issue entirely.106 For example, in Audi
AG v. D’Amato, the Sixth Circuit found that the defendant, D’Amato, had infringed Audi’s
automobile trademarks by registering the website “www.audisport.com” and selling goods
bearing Audi trademarks.107 The court, citing eBay, also approved the district court’s granting of
a permanent injunction.108 The court found that, if D’Amato’s infringing activities were not
stopped, Audi would be irreparably harmed.109 The court never mentioned nor commented on
the presumption of irreparable harm.110
Following its avoidance of the issue in Paulsson, the Fifth Circuit, as well as the Third
Circuit, have taken explicit stances on the presumption.111 In 2013, the Fifth Circuit declared
“[T]here seems little doubt that money damages are inadequate to compensate [the owner] for
continuing acts of [the infringer].”112 However, the Third Circuit’s Ferring decision provided “a
plaintiff must establish irreparable harm . . . in a trademark infringement case” to receive a
preliminary injunction.113 In spite of this, the Third Circuit has since then declared in Groupe
SEB United States, Inc. v. Euro-Pro Operating LLC that “the logic underlying the presumption . .
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Id.
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See generally Audi AG v. D'Amato, 469 F.3d 534 (6th Cir. 2006).
107
Id. at 542-545.
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Id. at 550.
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Id.
110
Id.
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See Abraham v. Alpha Chi Omega, 708 F.3d 614, 627 (5th Cir. 2013); Ferring Pharms., Inc. v. Watson Pharms.,
Inc., 765 F.3d 205, 216 (3d Cir. 2014).
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Abraham, 708 F.3d at 627 (internal quotations omitted).
113
Ferring Pharms., Inc., 765 F.3d at 216 (“We agree with the holding and rationale of the Herb Reed court”)
(citing Herb Reed Enters., LLC v. Fla Entm’t Mgmt. Inc., 736 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 2013)).
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. inform[s] how [courts] exercise [their] equitable discretion in [each] case.”114 That logic
consisted of the notions that trademark infringement:
“necessarily causes . . . product harm by diminishing its value in the mind of consumers .
. . [and that such] harm necessarily caused to reputation and goodwill is irreparable
because it is virtually impossible to quantify in terms of monetary damages.”115
In Euro-Pro, the court applied this same logic in a false-advertising case and granted a
preliminary injunction largely by pointing to the plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the merits
and the competitive nature of the plaintiff and defendant.116 The court asserted that it was “not
connecting these facts using a veiled presumption of irreparable harm,” but instead “drawing [a]
fair inference[ ] from the facts in the record.”117
III. Herb Reed Enters, LLC v. Fla Entm’t Mgmt. Inc.
The litigation leading up to the Ninth’s Circuit’s Herb Reed decision spanned several
decades and the entire country.118 Throughout the 1950s, “The Platters” were a “global
sensation.”119 During the band’s glory days, each of the bands five original members assigned
their rights to the name “The Platters” to their manager’s company, Five Platters, Inc. (FPI).
However, following the band’s breakup in the 1960s, each member of the former band, and
various organizations associated with it, continued using some form of The Platters mark.120
Not surprisingly, litigation over use of The Platters mark ensued; beginning in 1972, and
continuing for many years after that, a complicated series of lawsuits were filed in California,
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Groupe SEB United States, Inc. v. Euro-Pro Operating LLC, 774 F.3d 192, 205 n.8 (3d Cir. 2014).
Id.
116
Id. at 205-207.
117
Id. (emphasis added).
118
Herb Reed Enters., LLC v. Fla Entm’t Mgmt. Inc., 736 F.3d 1239, 1243-45 (9th Cir. 2013).
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Id. at 1242-43.
120
Id.
115

http://scholarship.law.uc.edu/ipclj/vol1/iss1/2

14

Kremer: Requiring Plaintiffs to Prove Irreparable Harm: “It Isn’t Right.”

New York, Florida, and Nevada regarding the rights to The Platters mark.121 In 2011, Herb Reed
Enterprises (HRE), an organization formed to manage the business of The Platters’ founding
member, Herb Reed, obtained a default judgment in Nevada that declared FPI never had the
rights to The Platters mark and that Herb Reed “has superior rights to the mark [over] all others,
including FPI and anyone claiming rights from or through FPI.”122
Subsequently, HRE filed a trademark infringement suit against Larry Marshak and his
music organizing and promoting company, Florida Entertainment Management, Inc. for fielding
bands under the name The Platters.123 Marshak claimed he had received rights to The Platters
mark through a series of transactions beginning with FPI.124 The district court concluded that
HRE had senior rights to the mark and that Marshak was using a confusingly similar—indeed,
the exact same—mark.125 In doing so, a likelihood of success on the merits had been
established.126
While recognizing the historical tradition of presuming irreparable harm in trademark
infringement cases, the district court chose not to apply the presumption in light of Supreme
Court and Ninth Circuit precedent.127 However, the court still concluded that the likelihood of
Marshak’s infringement, as well as the likely infringement of countless other bands, would cause
irreparable harm to HRE if an injunction were not granted.128 The court also found that the
hardships likely to result from the damage to HRE’s mark outweighed Marshak’s hardship of
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Id. at 1243-45.
Id. at 1244. (internal quotes omitted).
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Herb Reed Enters., LLC v. Fla. Entm't Mgmt., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102566, at *17 (D. Nev. July 24, 2012).
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Herb Reed, 736 F.3d at 1245.
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Herb Reed, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102566, 2012 at *34-35.
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Id.
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Id. at *43-44. (citing eBay lnc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 393 (2006); Flexible Lifeline Systems,
Inc. v. Precision Lift, Inc., 654 F.3d 989, 1000 (9th Cir.2011)).
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Id.
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having to identify its “Platters” bands as tribute bands.129 Finally, citing to the fact that
trademark law is supposed to prevent consumer confusion, the court declared that an injunction
against Marshak would accomplish that goal.130
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the decision of the district court.131 The reason for
the reversal centered largely on the presence, or lack thereof, of evidence of irreparable harm.132
The Ninth Circuit, like the district court, affirmatively declared that a presumption of irreparable
harm could no longer be applied to trademark infringement cases.133 In coming to this
conclusion, the Ninth Circuit observed that both the Patent Act and Lanham Act state that
“injunctions may be granted in accordance with ‘the principles of equity.’”134 The Ninth Circuit
reasoned that since eBay required all of the permanent injunction factors to be proven in the
patent context as a result of this language, the same result should occur in the trademark context
since it, too, used the same statutory language.135
Going beyond that, however, the court also held that eBay’s holding (that all four factors
must be established to grant permanent injunctions in patent infringement cases) applies to
preliminary injunctions in trademark infringement cases as well.136 The court believed this
conclusion was consistent with its application of no presumption of irreparable harm in obtaining
preliminary injunctions in copyright infringement cases and permanent injunctions in trademark
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Id.
Id.
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Herb Reed Enters., LLC v. Fla Entm’t Mgmt. Inc., 736 F.3d 1239, 1250 (9th Cir. 2013).
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 1249 (citing 35 USCS § 283; 15 USC § 1116(a)).
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cases.137 This decision, the Ninth Circuit declared, put it on the same page with the Eleventh and
Sixth Circuits.138
The Ninth Circuit criticized the district court for reasoning solely with “platitudes” and
asserted that the district court’s conclusion of irreparable harm was, essentially, based “solely on
a strong case for infringement.”139 All this did, the court declared, was “collapse[ ] the
likelihood of success and irreparable harm factors.”140 The Ninth Circuit declared that
“[e]vidence of loss of control over business reputation and damage to goodwill could constitute
irreparable harm.”141 In the end, the Ninth Circuit found no evidence in the record to indicate
that irreparable harm was likely without a preliminary injunction and remanded it back to the
district court without looking into the other preliminary injunction factors.142 The Supreme
Court denied certiorari of the case in October 2014.143
IV. Discussion
The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Herb Reed is deeply concerning, as well as its
conclusion that a presumption of irreparable harm can no longer be applied at the preliminary
injunction phase of trademark infringement litigation. Chief among the court’s flawed reasoning
is the Ninth Circuit’s failure to recognize that trademarks are simply different from patents,
copyrights, and other types of legal and equitable harms—a notion that has been consistently
recognized by the Supreme Court. Furthermore, a careful analysis of eBay and Winter
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Id. at 1249 (citing Flexible Lifeline Sys. v. Precision Lift, Inc., 654 F.3d 989, 998 (9th Cir. 2011); Reno Air
Racing Ass'n, Inc., v. McCord, 452 F.3d 1126, 1137-38 (9th Cir. 2006)).
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Id. (citing N. Am. Med. Corp. v. Axiom Worldwide, Inc., 522 F.3d 1211, 1228-29 (11th Cir. 2008); Audi AG v.
D'Amato, 469 F.3d 534, 550 (6th Cir. 2006).
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Id. at 1250.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Herb Reed Enters., LLC v. Fla. Entm't Mgmt., 135 S.Ct. 57 (2014).
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demonstrate that, in abandoning the presumption, the Ninth’s Circuit’s reliance on these
decisions is misplaced. In addition, the Ninth Circuit incorrectly concluded the Eleventh and
Sixth Circuits agree that the presumption of irreparable harm no longer applies in trademark
infringement cases. The Ninth Circuit also failed to realize that even if the express presumption
of harm were taken away, its spirit and effect would necessarily continue to influence cases.
Finally, the Ninth Circuit’s assertion that the presumption of irreparable harm neutralizes the
principles of equity is unfounded, because the presumption, by itself, cannot result in the
granting of an injunction.
A. Trademarks Are Different Than Other Forms of Intellectual Property
The Supreme Court has unfailingly recognized that, despite their shared moniker of
“intellectual property,” trademarks are different from both copyrights and patents and should not
be treated the same.144 In the past, for example, the Court has declared that trademarks have a
different constitutional foundation from patents and copyrights,145 that trademark rights are
gained and maintained in different fashions than patents and copyrights,146 and that trademarks
have a different standard for contributory liability than copyrights.147 Perhaps, most importantly,
the Supreme Court has illustrated that the purposes of trademark law, primarily the protection of

Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439 n.19 (1984) (“We have consistently
rejected the proposition that a similar kinship exists between copyright law and trademark law, and in the process of
doing so have recognized the basic similarities between copyrights and patents.”).
145
Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 93-94 (1879) (asserting that the foundation of trademark law cannot be found in
the Intellectual Property Clause of the U.S. Constitution).
146
United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918) (asserting that, unlike patents and
copyrights, trademarks confer no “right in gross” and can only be maintained through continued use in commerce
regulated by Congress and the States); see also Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 94 (asserting that trademark
recognition often depends solely on use, versus patents and copyrights which depend on criteria including
“originality . . . novelty, invention, discovery, or any work of the brain.”).
147
Sony, 464 U.S. at 439 n.19. (“Given the fundamental differences between copyright law and trademark law . . .
we do not look to the standard for contributory infringement set forth in Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives
Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854-855 (1982)[.]”).
144
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consumers from infringing goods, is different from that of patent and copyright law, which is to
promote the creation of inventions and creative works for public consumption.148 An
understanding of these distinctions also demonstrates why the Supreme Court’s holdings in eBay
and Winter are consistent with the presumption of irreparable harm in trademark infringement
cases.149
In addition to these differences with copyrights and patents, trademark infringement
represents a different kind of harm because it is an injury that is often recognized as being
inherently irreparable.150 Owners of a trademark do not want to be compensated for damage
done to their trademark; they want to act quickly to prevent the damage from occurring in the
first place or limit the amount of damage done, making the preliminary injunction the natural
tool to accomplish this.151 Trademark infringement causes of action allow plaintiffs to receive
preliminary injunctions even if there is no actual confusion that has resulted in economic
harm.152 If no evidence of actual confusion or economic harm need exist for a court to grant a
preliminary injunction, then it is unclear, at best, what evidence is needed to satisfy the Herb
Reed court that irreparable harm exists in a trademark infringement cases.153
The notion that a legal harm can be inherently irreparable is neither novel nor exclusive
to trademark law.154 Indeed, courts have determined that irreparable harm could be presumed in

148

Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954); Inwood
Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 855 (1982); Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505
U.S. 763, 782, n.15, 112 S. Ct. 2753, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d 1081 (1992) (J. Stevens, concurring).
149
This idea is discussed more fully below in Part IV, Section B.
150
MCCARTHY, supra note 39, at § 30:46; see also WRIGHT AND MILLER, supra note 47, at § 2948.1.
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See id. As McCarthy aptly analogizes: “Like trying to un-ring a bell, trying to ‘compensate’ after the fact for
damage to business goodwill and reputation cannot constitute just or full compensation [to a trademark owner].” Id.
Even more than that, money damages do nothing to remedy the confusion that consumers may or may not have
already experienced.
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See AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348, 353 (9th Cir. 1979); 15 USCS § 1125(c)(1).
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See MCCARTHY, supra note 39, at § 30:47.
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See Sanchez, supra note 61, at 560.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2016

19

The University of Cincinnati Intellectual Property and Computer Law Journal, Vol. 1 [2016], Iss. 1, Art. 2

cases where plaintiffs have proven a likelihood of success on the merits that their rights have
been violated, including cases involving First Amendment freedoms, broadcasting without a
license, and Title VII employment discrimination.155 As a result of the different constitutional
foundations, purposes, and nature of the harms associated with trademark law, it simply does not
make sense for the Ninth Circuit to unhesitatingly apply eBay and Winter to trademark
infringement cases.
B. The Presumption in Trademark Cases Is Consistent with eBay and Winter
A closer look at eBay and Winter illustrates that the presumption of irreparable harm in
trademark cases is consistent with those decisions.156 There is much evidence to suggest that
eBay leaves the presumption unaffected.157 One reason is that the issue in eBay was whether or
not an injunction should be entered immediately upon a finding of infringement in a patent case,
essentially barring analysis of any of the injunction factors.158 However, at issue in cases such as
Herb Reed is not whether the injunction factors should be ignored upon a likely finding of
trademark infringement, but whether just one factor, irreparable harm, can be presumed.159
In addition, even if the eBay decision stood for the general proposition that each factor,
including irreparable harm, must be demonstrated before an injunction can ever be granted, there
is evidence suggesting that this should not affect the presumption of irreparable harm in
trademark infringement suits.160 Firstly, trademarks are not mentioned once in eBay.161 This
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Id. at 560-61.
Id. at 555.
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See generally eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
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See id. at 391; See also Sanchez, supra note 61, at 555.
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Brief for the International Trademark Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Herb Reed
Enterprises, LLC v. Florida Entertainment Management, Inc. and Larry Marshak 135 S.Ct. 57 (2014) (No. 13-1271),
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fact is especially noteworthy in light of the fact that the majority decision outlined similarities
between the patent and copyright holders, including “the right to exclude others from using” the
patents or copyrights at issue, as well as the fact that the Patent and Copyright Acts contain
similar language regarding when courts may grant injunctions.162 The Ninth Circuit leaned
heavily on the fact that the Patent Act and Lanham Act both assert that injunctions are supposed
to be granted “in accordance with the principles of equity,” but failed to reconcile this assertion
with the fact that the Supreme Court in eBay left out trademarks in its discussion of how the
Patent and Copyright Act are also similarly worded.163
Secondly, both Justices Roberts’ and Kennedy’s concurring decisions suggest that the
application of eBay outside of the patent context should be practiced cautiously.164 Justice
Roberts clearly indicated in his decision that the court’s conclusion in eBay was directed at
longstanding practices in patent litigation and further suggested that the manner in which the
injunction factors have been applied historically in other contexts should not be cast aside in
light of eBay.165 Justice Kennedy echoed these concerns and also asserted that the primary goal
of patent law, creating inventions beneficial to the public by incentivizing inventors, can still be
realized even when products contain infringing components by potentially allowing the product
to go to market and simply giving legal damages to the plaintiff.166 This would not be the case
with products containing infringing trademarks; an infringing trademark, unlike a small patented
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Id. at 392-93; see also Sanchez, supra note 61, at 555.
Herb Reed Enters., LLC v. Fla Entm’t Mgmt. Inc., 736 F.3d 1239, 1249 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing 35 USCS § 283;
15 USCS § 1116(a)).
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See eBay, 547 U.S. at 394-97 (JJ. Roberts and Kennedy, concurring).
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component of a product, is reason enough to prevent the product from reaching the public,
because a main purpose of trademark law is to protect consumers from misidentified goods.167
Similarly, there is substantial evidence to suggest that Winter, likewise, does not affect
the presumption of harm in trademark infringement cases.168 For example, Winter, like eBay,
never mentioned a presumption of irreparable harm, much less ruled that such a presumption was
inconsistent with the rules of equity.169 Winter simply held that a mere “possibility” of
irreparable harm is incapable of satisfying the second preliminary injunction factor.170 However,
given the irreparable nature of trademark infringement, as discussed above, once a finding
supporting a likelihood of trademark infringement has been found, it is presumed that
“irreparable harm is at least likely and not merely possible.”171 The issue of whether or not
trademark infringement will result in irreparable harm to the trademark owner is often much
clearer than it is in cases such as Winter.172 For trademark infringement cases where irreparable
harm is more debatable, however, the presumption is rebuttable.173
C. The Ninth Circuit Does Not Have the Support It Says It Does
In spite of the Ninth Circuit’s assertions, it does not have the support of the Eleventh or
Sixth Circuits on this issue.174 The Ninth Circuit cited to Audi and Axiom Worldwide and
asserted that each case also declared the presumption was no longer valid in a preliminary
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See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 US 763 782, n.15 (1992) (J. Stevens, Concurring).
See generally Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008); see also Sanchez, supra note 61,
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170
Id.
171
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injunction context.175 This could not be further from the truth.176 At issue in Audi, like eBay,
was a permanent injunction.177 While the Sixth Circuit cited eBay, the court made no affirmative
declaration that the presumption of irreparable harm no longer existed in a permanent injunction
context, much less a preliminary injunction context.178 In addition, the Sixth Circuit’s analysis
of irreparable harm appeared largely based on its finding that Audi was likely to succeed on its
trademark infringement claim, demonstrating the presumptively irreparable nature of trademark
infringement.179
Similar to Audi, the Eleventh Circuit in Axiom Worldwide did not do away with the
presumption of irreparable harm.180 The Eleventh Circuit’s recognition that the presumption has
been under fire cannot be construed as a declaration that the presumption no longer exists,
especially in light of the court explicitly refusing to decide the issue.181 The court also left it
within the power of the district court, upon remand, to continue to apply the presumption.182
Such a result, the court hinted, would still be in line with the “historical traditions” of the
concurring opinions by Justices Roberts and Kennedy in eBay.183 Upon closer scrutiny of both
Audi and Axiom Worldwide than the Ninth Circuit afforded those cases, it becomes clear that the
Ninth Circuit does not have the support it says it does when asserting that the presumption no
longer applies in trademark infringement cases.184

Herb Reed Enters., LLC v. Fla Entm’t Mgmt. Inc., 736 F.3d 1239, 1249 (9th Cir. 2013).
MCCARTHY, supra note 39, at § 30:47:30.
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Audi AG v. D'Amato, 469 F.3d 534, 550 (6th Cir. 2006).
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MCCARTHY, supra note 39, at § 30:47:30 n.7.
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See Audi AG v. D'Amato, 469 F.3d 534, 542-545 (6th Cir. 2006).
180
MCCARTHY, supra note 39, at § 30:47:30.
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N. Am. Med. Corp. v. Axiom Worldwide, Inc., 522 F.3d 1211, 1228 (11th Cir. 2008).
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Id.
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Id.
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MCCARTHY, supra note 39, at § 30:47:30 n.7. It must be admitted, however, that in-spite of the incorrect
assertion that the Herb Reed court had the support of the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits, it has, since its decision,
clearly gained the support of the Third Circuit. Ferring Pharms., Inc. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 765 F.3d 205, 216
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D. Taking Away the Presumption in Name Will Not Take Away from the Presumption in Effect
Even if the express presumption of irreparable harm in trademark infringement cases
were to be done away with, it would still exist in effect. Without the express presumption of
harm, plaintiffs would have no recourse to demonstrate irreparable harm but to “point[ ] to the
fact that [a] trademark owner’s business goodwill and reputation are in peril” as a result of the
infringement, and plaintiffs would do this by pointing to the likelihood of success on the merits
for trademark infringement.185 This is already being demonstrated at the appellate level.186 Audi
AG is an example of this.187 The Sixth Circuit relied exclusively on its finding that D’Amato’s
selling of infringing items to consumers would cause irreparable harm to Audi.188 The court
made no mention of the presumption, but just as the presumption would have courts do, the court
inferred irreparable harm from a finding of infringement.189 The same result occurred in
Paulsson.190 While stating that it would not expressly endorse the presumption in light of eBay,
the court ultimately granted a preliminary injunction by citing to the defendant’s infringement,
inferring that the defendant’s action would harm the plaintiff’s goodwill and reputation in current
and future markets, and asserting that such harm was not quantifiable and, thus, irreparable.191

(3d Cir. 2014) (“We agree with the holding and rationale of the Herb Reed court”) (citing Herb Reed Enters., LLC
v. Fla Entm’t Mgmt. Inc., 736 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 2013).
185
MCCARTHY, supra note 39, at § 30:47:30. (citing Juice Couture, Inc. v. Bella Intern. Ltd., 930 F. Supp. 2d 489,
503 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Paulsson Geophysical Services, Inc. v. Sigmar, 529 F.3d 303, 312 (5th Cir. 2008).
186
See, e.g. Audi AG v. D'Amato, 469 F.3d 534 (6th Cir. 2006); Paulsson Geophysical Servs. v. Sigmar, 529 F.3d
303 (5th Cir. 2008); Groupe SEB United States, Inc. v. Euro-Pro Operating LLC, 774 F.3d 192 (3d Cir. 2014).
187
See generally, Audi AG, 469 F.3d 534.
188
Id. at 542-545.
189
Id.
190
Paulsson Geophysical Servs. v. Sigmar, 529 F.3d 303, 305 (5th Cir. 2008).
191
Id. at 313.
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Even the Third Circuit, which declared in Ferring that it no longer applied a presumption
of harm in Lanham Act cases, demonstrated in Euro-Pro that it is difficult to truly separate the
likelihood of success on the merits and irreparable harm.192 The Third Circuit’s distinction
between the presumption of irreparable harm and an “inference” of irreparable harm based on the
facts of a case is simply laughable because, by its very definition, a presumption is nothing more
than an inference based on facts already before a court.193 Just like the courts in Audi and
Paulson, the Euro-Pro Court’s conclusion that irreparable harm would occur in this falseadvertising context rested largely on the likelihood of success on the merits of proving falseadvertising.194
The Herb Reed court criticized the district court for talking in “platitudes” with its
irreparable harm analysis and for not demanding any real evidence of such harm.195 However,
missing from the Fifth Circuit decision is any clear standard as to what evidence could be
presented to demonstrate irreparable harm.196 The court appeared to set a very high standard for
demonstrating such harm when it said that actual “[e]vidence of loss of control over business
reputation and damage to goodwill could constitute irreparable harm.”197 As demonstrated
above, circuit courts have shown a tendency and need to rely more on the inference that
trademark infringement will result in irreparable harm rather than force a whole new evidentiary
inquiry where the harm at issue might not yet exist and be difficult to quantify.
E. Procedural Safety Measures Ensure the Presumption is Not Too Powerful
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Groupe SEB United States, Inc. v. Euro-Pro Operating LLC, 774 F.3d 192 (3d Cir. 2014).
Black’s Law Dictionary 1376 (10th ed. 2014).
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Euro-Pro, 774 F.3d at 205.
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The presumption of irreparable harm is not nearly as powerful as the Ninth Circuit
believes it to be, because there are several other procedural hurdles that must be overcome before
an injunction is actually put in place by the courts. The first of these is that the presumption is
rebuttable; the defendant still has the opportunity to demonstrate that their activities will not
result in irreparable harm to the plaintiff.198 In addition, the presumption of irreparable harm
only satisfies one of the four factors needed to get a preliminary injunction.199 Plaintiffs must
still prove that they are likely to succeed on the trademark infringement claim, that the overall
balance of equity favors them, and that an injunction is in the public’s best interest.200
Furthermore, courts have consistently asserted that the presumption is most powerful in cases
where the finding of a likelihood of confusion is very strong.201 In cases where the finding of
confusion is not as strong, courts are sometimes more hesitant to presume irreparable harm.202
Yet another procedural safeguard that protects the defendant from the presumption of
irreparable harm is that a bond must be posted before a plaintiff can receive an injunction.203
This bond must cover the “costs and damages sustained by any party found to have been
wrongfully enjoined or restrained.”204 As a result, the bond amount can fluctuate wildly, from
tens of thousands of dollars, to hundreds of thousands and even millions.205 The requirement of
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the plaintiff to post bond is not often waived.206 Contrary to the critics of the presumption, it has
never “function[ed] as an automatic or general grant of an injunction[.]”207
IV. Conclusion
In spite of the Herb Reed decision, plaintiffs such as Herb Reed should not have the
presumption of irreparable harm taken away from them when they have a likelihood of success
on the merits in proving trademark infringement. There are many reasons to come to this
conclusion. First, despite their shared moniker of “intellectual property,” trademarks have
consistently been treated differently under the law than patents and copyrights because each has
a different constitutional foundation and serves a different purpose in society. In addition, the
harms associated with the infringement of trademarks are inherently irreparable, and this notion
of inherent irreparableness is accepted in other causes of action.
Secondly, a more thorough textual analysis of the majority and concurring opinions in the
Supreme Court’s eBay Inc., v. MercExchange, LLC and Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.
decisions reveal, contrary to the Ninth Circuit’s cursory analysis, that the presumption of
irreparable harm is consistent with those decisions. Thirdly, the Herb Reed court has much less
support from the other circuit courts than it asserted it does. Upon a closer reading of the Sixth
Circuit’s decision in Audi AG and the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Axiom Worldwide, neither
Circuit, as the Herb Reed court asserted, declared that the presumption could no longer be
applied in trademark infringement cases.
Fourth, the Ninth Circuit failed to realize that even if the express presumption of
irreparable harm is taken away, it is still going to exist behind the scenes and influence the
206
207

Id. at § 30:55.
Ferring Pharms., Inc. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 765 F.3d 205, 217 (3d Cir. 2014).
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outcome of trademark infringement cases. This is already being demonstrated at the circuit
level. Finally, the Ninth Circuit gave no recognition to the fact that the presumption of
irreparable harm is not the only inquiry in granting a preliminary injunction in a trademark
infringement suit. There are several other factors and procedural hurdles that must be met in
order for a preliminary injunction to be implemented. Together, these factors demonstrate that
the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion is not the correct one and could potentially cause great harm to the
consuming public and to trademark owners trying to police their rights.
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